Thomas777 and Pete Quinones - The Revisionist Dialogues

Volume VI - The ''Appeasement'' Myth

THOMAS

Okay, I think we finished off in 1936. We were talking about Mr. Churchill gaining access to Baldwin, quite literally. We discussed how the focus had come to be and how Churchill became a permanent thorn in the side, not just of Baldwin, but of any establishment figure—Tory, Labor, or liberal—who opposed rearmament and a confrontational posture with Germany.

Okay. So think where I think we left off was I pointed out that Churchill, despite his kind of, by this point, which is 1936, despite his constant epilogue for the Soviet Union and his kind of fervent, increasingly shrill hostility to Germany. And these confabulated figures and statistics that the focus group were submitting as actual data, like always from undisclosed, undisclosed intelligence sources. Well, all this was going on, of, and I don't want to derail us into a tangent, but it's a matter of material significance to what was underway within the UK. The Civil War was raging hard at this point. And that was a real impact every culture on the continent, political culture, I mean, in a way that really can't be overstated. It wasn't just a military quagmire for the Spaniards and for the Iberian Peninsula generally, or for the security in the Mediterranean.

There was a collision of worldviews between the communists and their opponents all in sundry. Some of these people were fascists in the Falange , there was an Iron Guard volunteers from Romania. You even had like Carlists, monarchist types in the ranks. You had, National Socialists deployed with Condor Legion from Germany.

You had a whole population of Italian volunteers. But also, I mean, basically everybody. One of the reasons why I don't want to get into the intricacies that led Franco to being kind of the front man of the nationalist cause, but Franco was somewhat apolitical. Even then, even well before, he became this kind of Cold War intriguer who was kind of all things to all people. He, Franco, the man himself, like much as he might have been lampooned as something of crude figure, common to the Latin American world, as we would think of it here like it the way he was viewed in Europe would be kind of the way we people would have viewed Perone. But aside from all of that, I mean, it was more acceptable to support a figure like Franco than, it would have been some kind of ideologically committed fascist. But at the same time, there was a certain perfidy to a Churchill coming out in support of the nationalists, meanwhile, declaring it essential to stand with the Soviet Union against Germany and what he suggested was Germany irredentism

Part of this was the Republican government under Juan Negrín. Negrín had support from the Soviet Cheka and all kinds of police and military elements from the Soviet Union, including a young Eric Mielke, who went on to be the Stasi chief for decades. But brutality was carried out in the name of the Republican cause, which was really just the red cause in fancy dress. Particularly, clergymen and women were targeted. It may sound like a propaganda cliché, but nuns really were victims of systematic rape and other atrocities.

And, the cemeteries where clergy people were buried were subject to destruction, and their remains were disinterred and desecrated—just horrible, horrible stuff. So, Churchill went on record in Parliament, as well as in his very lucrative newspaper contracts as an editorial writer, in support of Franco. That was an early example, I think, of these kinds of competing loyalties that he was forced to contend with. I mean, even in my political life, even a man whose sympathies are quite literally bought has to perform something of a delicate dance in that regard. But this was unusual, even considering the man in question and even considering the realities of modern political life.

This was a bizarre circumstance when I'm getting it, and that the terms of debate and discourse were not normal at all, even the shenanigans of The Focus notwithstanding. Now, bring it back. It's the year 1936, and what's happening in Berlin at this time. Erhard Milch, who we discussed in the last episode, and I come back to him a lot just because he was a prolific diarist, but after the war, Milch was very open. He allowed very few people into his intimate circles, but those that he did, he was very open with them about his wartime activities and about what was underway in Berlin in the years leading up to the onset of hostilities. Particularly, as we established, Milch was something of a go-between with the UK and Berlin unofficially.

Milch was an unusual guy, as we raised, his father was Jewish.
So he was mixed blood. He was the CEO of Lufthansa. He was something of a military genius and demonstrated true aptitude for the potential of air power and its utility, especially in ground assault and combined arms. In 1936, he submitted to Göring, who was chief of the Luftwaffe, his own strategic vision for Germany's defense needs in terms of the Luftwaffe. Air forces were new then, truly nascent. It was a statement of what they should present to the Führer in terms of allocation for the development and sustainability of forces needed to credibly project power. Additionally, it was a strategic survey of what the next war would look like.

And it was exhaustive, entitled "Thoughts on an Air War." It contained not a single mention of the UK or the Royal Air Force – it was exclusively focused on France as the probable adversary. Plenty of mentions of the Soviet Union, but at this point, the relation between Berlin and Moscow, while at times frosty, had a Damocles’ Sword hanging above it due to the violently-at-odds governing ideologies. That's part of where both derived their legitimacy. However, there was an outward diplomatic courting of the Soviet Union.

This is one of the reasons, in my opinion, why Strasser had been done away with, but that's a tangent for later. There was a strenuous avoidance, dictated by Hitler, to provoke the Soviet Union unless it was a matter of essential security. However, there was literally not a single mention of the UK or the RAF.

This was an "eyes-only" study. Now, this contrasts not just with Churchill's Germanophobia and these confabulated statistics about German rearmament, forces, capabilities, and intentions. The British Foreign Office, most notably Lord Vansittart, who became infamous not just in revisionist circles, but I think he's rather an ugly character, regardless of one's politics. He was the permanent chief of the Foreign Office for practical purposes, with power over whoever happened to be the foreign minister at any given time in any given administration. Also, he was able to set the tenor of the diplomatic corps, and these men with permanent sinecures in the Foreign Office, almost to a man, were profoundly hostile to Germany. It's a complicated issue, and some of it's attributable to the same motives that animated the men associated with The Focus. Still, most of them preceded that, having more to do with the kind of antipathy to the Germans characteristic of King George's era, a long hangover from the Great War.

And we talked a bit about incidents like when Wilhelm congratulated Kruger on his victories against the crown in the Orange Free State and Cape. There was a lingering and sharp hostility to Germany in the Foreign Office that preceded The Focus. That becomes important later, and it's crucial to understanding the British establishment at this time. I believe this is one of the factors that, despite the great power and wealth at its disposal and its ability to create propaganda infrastructure where there wasn't any, occasioned The Focus to develop in the first place.

Now, this gets really interesting if we look at the backdrop of what happened from 1935 to 1937. First of all, let it be said that around the same time Milch submitted his thoughts on the air war to Goring. Many revisionists, including Irving and myself (though I'm obviously not in the same league as Irving), posit that this is persuasive testimony about the intentions of the German regime.

OK, as of 1936, and as we've said, Milch would be in a position to know, not just be aware, but he was in a position to directly impact policy through his evaluations and recommendations. So, in his "Thoughts on an Air War," there is not a single mention of the UK as a probable adversary.

Also, in 1936, Hitler deployed Joachim von Ribbentrop to London as an ambassador before Ribbentrop became the foreign minister. Hitler's instructions were clear: Ribbentrop was told to bring about an alliance with the United Kingdom. Ribbentrop, though not a particularly complex figure and unfairly lampooned as a foppish, ignorant, rich man, spoke fluent English and had lived in Canada. He was something of a globe-trotting businessman, a role that was rather rare at that time, even for many government officials.

Ribbentrop was a very worldly figure. Despite his shortcomings and questionable ability to judge character, in Ribbentrop's case, this was not one of them. He actually got on reasonably well with his counterparts. Churchill deliberately sought him out to insult him on a couple of occasions, and historians have made much of that. However, even Chamberlain himself, while not having particularly warm relations with Ribbentrop, found him amiable. I raise this again as an example of executive intention in Berlin and its disposition towards London.

This was part of an ongoing effort by Germany to court the UK, the above-board aspect of it. In the preceding summer of 1935, as part of this ongoing rapport that Erhard Milch had with the British Air Ministry, Hitler authorized Göring, through Milch, to submit actual intelligence data on forces, capabilities, and intentions to London. This was on the condition that their counterparts in the Air Ministry wouldn't disclose this information to any other state and that it wouldn't be announced in Parliament or exploited for political purposes. It was essentially a goodwill gesture. However, the Foreign Office intercepted it and demanded that Ambassador Eric Phipps reject it, which is incredible.

Think about that. Even if this data was submitted in bad faith, even if it was confabulated (which it wasn't, for the record), it was entirely what it appeared to be. You don't reject any data from a potential adversary or another great power because data is data. You need it to build a conceptual picture of the strategic landscape. The fact that the Foreign Office was unwilling to entertain anything that appeared to be a good-faith diplomatic overture in any sense is incredible.

Milch, who in many ways was more effective than Göring, probably, bypassed the Foreign Office entirely. He directly approached the Committee of Imperial Defense, which, as we talked about, was a counterpart in many respects to the General Staff in Germany or the American Joint Chiefs. He presented his figures, and both the Committee of Imperial Defense and the Air Ministry validated them as accurate. This was in part because they reflected what British intelligence, particularly the Air Ministry's intelligence arm, had compiled.

In other words, this would be the equivalent of, say, a regime that was suspected of cultivating radioactive material for military purposes granting open access to its nuclear reactors. It's an imperfect analogy, but it was what it appeared to be. It was a good-faith gesture that demonstrated, "We're not developing a strategic capability with London in mind, and we're certainly not aiming to develop an air arm to terrorize the UK and submit it either by the threat of force or by the application of it." Even if it were disingenuous, sort of legerdemain (which it was not), it's incredible that it was utterly rejected outright by the Foreign Office.

The Focus and the Foreign Office had similar intentions. We come back to the Focus statement of purpose, which was to counter any inference, suggestion, or appearance that anything Berlin demands, suggests, or claims to desire is legitimate on any front in any capacity. This is exactly the way to understand that particular situation.

Now, of course, this data is fed to Mr. Chamberlain just before or just after he becomes Prime Minister. Churchill, The Focus, as well as many of Chamberlain's opponents, who aren't particularly associated with Mr. Churchill or The Focus but are always eager to find a way to impeach the credibility of the sitting Prime Minister, seized upon the notion that Chamberlain is leaving the UK vulnerable based upon Germany's ambitions.

So, when Chamberlain becomes PM, he is quickly advised of the Air Ministry's unofficial meetings with Milch and the figures they were provided. The only response from Lord Vansittart, Churchill, or the focus is merely that Milch was lying, nothing more or nothing less. They claim, "Germans can't be trusted. They are lying." For example, Hitler also said that the German army would not exceed half a million men. They are essentially stating that the Germans are liars because they claimed to be compliant with the Versailles Treaty, which was later acknowledged as an unjust and unsustainable treaty. When the Germans didn't comply, they were either sanctioned by occupation or faced further instrumental reparations. According to this line of reasoning, Germans simply can't be trusted in any statement they make. This is a tortured form of reasoning. However, the figures submitted by Milch were independently validated by the Air Ministry and the Committee of Imperial Defense. Despite this, if one yells things loud enough from proverbial rooftops and has the means, will, and bottomless coffers to generate a bully pulpit, it doesn't matter if the things being said are completely fabricated. This was especially effective because Chamberlain did not have a particularly strong mandate.

Now, the plot thickens a bit. In October 1937, the Air Ministry, indicating a kind of admirable streak of independence and reciprocity for the good offices demonstrated by Milch and their counterparts in the Luftwaffe, invited Milch himself and a German Air Force delegation for a tour of the ministry upon their return to Berlin. Milch, upon his return, is summoned by Hitler himself, which is remarkable. While Hitler was friendly with Milch and followed his career closely, they didn't have regular briefings. Hitler took a peculiar interest because he wanted Milch to relay everything he could about impressions of his counterparts and the political climate in London at the time. Milch attested in his own diaries that Hitler reiterated the idea that an alliance with the UK is absolutely essential. This serves as more direct testimonial evidence of Berlin's intentions as of 1937. Emphasizing this is crucial as we delve into the appeasement myth momentarily, and establishing this context is necessary to lay the foundation.

I'm not just trying to bore people with details or minutiae that happen to interest me. In November 1937, The Focus achieves its greatest coup regarding officialdom. Obviously, with the exception of when Mr. Churchill himself became Prime Minister. The Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, formally joins The Focus. His motivations are not something I'm an expert on concerning Eden. I believe he had certain insights, not so much into the international situation (although he had some of those too), but rather into the shifting dynamics within the UK. He may have realized that there was a changing tide regarding which factions and individuals would become the true power brokers. I think he preferred to align with The Focus as a friend rather than an enemy because he saw the writing on the wall. He believed, at some point, that Churchill and The Focus would get their way, and he wanted to survive that. This is just my own opinion, and I'm sure there are individuals, particularly Englishmen familiar with Eden and British politics, who may know more and possibly disagree, and they may be right.

That is my own take. Around the same time, a few months later in 1938, the international situation is heating up. Churchill meets with Joe P. Kennedy, who was the ambassador to the UK. Kennedy had been an early New Dealer until he and Roosevelt became estranged, owing in part to Roosevelt's appointment of Morgan Fowle, whom we dealt with a couple of episodes ago regarding his character. Kennedy found himself at loggerheads with Churchill, not just because Kennedy was a millionaire Irishman and could sense that Churchill disdained him due to his pedigree, but also because FDR directed Kennedy to have these friendly luncheons with Churchill to understand exactly what Churchill's intentions were regarding the international situation. It was clear to anyone with an understanding of the politics at play what their intentions were. When I say "they," I mean Churchill and The Focus, but it wasn't clear how they were going to insinuate their ambitions into policy. During the discussion, the topic was Ribbentrop, and Kennedy pointed out that Ribbentrop had offered that Germany would not only make no claim on the British Empire but would guarantee its continued existence. The condition was that the British would provide Germany with its colonies again, and the UK would not interfere in Germany's policy in the East.

Including in that guarantee was that the Wehrmacht would not move one inch westward. It should be noted that Hitler had no interest in the issue of colonies, but Ribbentrop and the foreign ministry did. However, that deserves treatment on its own. Like Vansittart, Churchill lamely replied when confronted with the figures submitted by Milch, dismissing them as lies and declaring that Ribbentrop was lying. Kennedy, somewhat shocked by this, was known for dirty tricks but found it telling that Churchill seemed singularly focused on pursuing war. It's revealing not that Churchill had these intentions but rather that Kennedy had an inner sense of the situation, but it's interesting because, moving forward, we will likely delve into this in the next episode. Joseph P. Kennedy became convinced that Churchill might actually have him arrested on trumped up charges or even have him murdered. I can't speak to the likelihood of that, but I only raise that because this is one of the catalysts that led to a lot of direct communication between Churchill and FDR himself. FDR was not a particularly accessible man, and we'll get into that later, probably not in this episode, but I want to lay out the foundation. I realize also I'm throwing a lot of unfamiliar personages at people, and I think Joe Kennedy ties the distant past, the kind of less remote past, and people's minds, if that makes any sense. Plus, I just find it interesting.

Now we're going to move on to some more interesting, sexy stuff. I hope no one's asleep yet. The Anschluss, the merger with Austria, not only was that one of the key ambitions of Hitler and the National Socialists and the Third Reich, but this was the big foreign policy move that set many things in motion, including what happened at Munich later.

This was a game-changer. The German world was clamoring for the unification of Austria and Germany proper. The Austrian Chancellor, Schuschnigg, opposed this at all costs. In one of the great foul ups in power politics and the gamesmanship therein, Schuschnigg, on March 12th, announced that there would be a plebiscite on independence starting March 13. Taking a page from the book of Adolf Hitler, Schuschnigg stated that the Austrians had the right to fight to the last man and would never accept becoming a part of Germany. To dispel any notion of a peaceful assimilation of Austria into Germany, he planned to hold a plebiscite to determine whether the Austrian people favored independence (a yes vote) or subjugation under the boot of the German Reich. Now, what did Schuschnigg do?

He only printed ballots containing the "yes" option and ordered their production. He also announced that voting against Austrian independence was a form of sedition and a crime. Upon learning that the average age of Austrian National Socialist Party members was 23, he arbitrarily raised the voting age to 24. If you ask me, that's a kind of electioneering worthy of America in 2020.

Adolf Hitler saw what was underway. As everybody knows, he preempted the Anschluss and Schuschnigg declaring martial law by deploying forces across the Austrian Frontier.

And, uh, the move was welcomed by the people. On April 10th, Hitler held a referendum on the same day as German elections. Lo and behold, 99.7% of all voters were in favor. Now, it must be stated that Jews, Roma, and Gypsies, as well as Communist Party members, were not extended the right to vote. Otherwise, though, even Life magazine, which was certainly no friend of the Third Reich, noted that Hitler ran on May 2nd, 1938. The election was certified as "basically fair." In other words, this was a legitimate reflection of public opinion among ethnic Germans and Austrians. Now, I can only imagine, this brings to mind the kind of abject lunacy of the Anglo-sphere and its moral camps. Do you realize if, I mean, the UK was not in a position to do so, and neither was France, but suppose there had been some kind of expeditionary force of the British and French army in concert with Schuschnigg's secret police assaulting Austria, to liberate them from a position that 99.7% of voting adults favored?

I mean, it's crazy. It defies imagination, but it made me think of what Nietzsche said about, particularly the United States and the UK, but pretty much the entire EU, which is under American dominion in terms of its values. Among other things all regimes lie, but when literally all you stand on is moral cant that are totally at odds with reality, it can lead to bizarre outcomes. You can find yourself at war based upon some kind of mythology that does not reflect strategic circumstances whatsoever. And there's really no other kind of regime like that, like dysfunctional as the East Block was, that wasn't something - there wasn't a risk of such things, but I find that fascinating.

PETE

Why did they assassinate Dolfuss?

THOMAS

Dolfuss was a national Catholic, basically something of a clerical fascist. I mean, I don't like that term, but that's one way to understand it. And he very much opposed what I think of as any kind of secular union with what had been Habsburg lands. He wanted an Austrian national state. I think of him as almost kind of like a Tito figure. I mean, yeah, he was presiding over a homogeneous population, but he was a sworn enemy of the national socialists. The Austrian national socialists were particularly violent, particularly revolutionary in disposition. That almost tanked the concord with Hitler and Mussolini. I believe that's one of the things that prompted Hitler to unconditionally cede the Tyrol to fascist Italy, the Tyrol region. Because Hitler was quite literally meeting with Mussolini when the news came in that Dolfuss had been assassinated
gangland style. That's why. And Schuschnigg, I think Dolfuss is more of a genuine patriot than Schuschnigg, but he was just as kind of pigheadedly uncompromising in terms of political realities. That's why it's a complicated issue. But the main thing is, Dolfuss seemed to believe that he could stay on course and with the backing of the Vatican, with the backing of Mussolini, he could keep the National Socialists down. He could keep the UK and France out, and he could keep Austria independent, if admittedly within the Italian orbit. That's why Hitler was infuriated that he was murdered. Not because he was in love with Dolfuss, but the Austrian National Socialists were kind of wild guys. They acquitted themselves very well on the battlefield. Ernst Kaltenbrunner, who succeeded Heydrich, he was one of the Austrian National Socialists. Especially in the later regime, a lot emerged in powerful roles, but that's the short answer.

PETE

Power politics?

THOMAS

Yeah, indeed. The issues with competing ethnic groups within arbitrarily drawn borders created problems of authority and determining the correct political trajectory. Not just in power political terms, but in terms of sustaining any kind of legitimacy. I mean, that's part of it. That's why, for such a small country, it took on an outsized significance. And that's why the Austrian National Socialists made this big impact. It's not just because they were violent; there were a lot of violent non-state actors in the interwar years that didn't make the same kind of impact.

PETE

Mises wrote about how border towns would be overrun by the neighboring population. So, you had a border town that would be Austrian, and then all of a sudden it's not.

THOMAS

A real anarchic political situation.

PETE

And his answer to that was just giving the town up. Yeah, it's better to just give the town up and not have to deal with that in your polity.

THOMAS

I want to go into a bit about the Munich situation because it's so immediate to the issue of Churchill and The Focus. They've been clamoring that Chamberlain must go. His unwillingness to hold fast on Austria shows that he doesn't have the backbone to defend the empire. This was ironically and perversely how The Focus sold their perspective in public because this is a threat to the empire – alleging a mortal threat to the empire. I mean, it was strategically absurd, but also I mean the one thing Britain could not do was fight a world war and keep its empire.

During this time, on the conditions, I'll dive into in a moment, people identified Czechoslovakia as the next great diplomatic and potential military catastrophe in the wake of Austria. Court historians claim it's because there was this madman who was just on the march and taking over places with hostility. And, that's why I referred at the outset of our discussion to the Appeasement myth because it really is a myth. That's not me putting shade on a term, only to my own political prejudices, and it really does not - it really does not reflect what was underway. Now, Chamberlain like I said before, right, I mean, Chamberlain was something of a dull personage, and that harmed him in public life, obviously. But he did have a good sense of things, and, in purely strategic terms, he understood the limitations of military power. As Churchill developed something of a quorum around himself, not just with The Focus, but with hostile opposition figures, Chamberlain's rebuttal was, okay. If we were to guarantee Czechoslovakia, the Czech frontier is essentially undefended. Okay. So there are no forces in being there that any British deployment would be kind of beefing up. At most, the UK could deploy at that time as of the summer of 1938, two divisions, and only seven viable modern fighter squadrons. The UK itself, to that point, had no heavy to medium aircraft capability.

And the big, I mean, the big menace, frankly, is regardless of how combat resolves on the continent, if Japan and Italy joined the fray, the British Empire was going to be, I mean, it was open to assault on numerous fronts. And it would be the definition of insanity to undertake those kinds of risks for Czechoslovakia. Interestingly, it was around this time we talked a great deal about Churchill's dire financial straits and how he was bailed out with huge sums of money by wealthy manufacturers who came to support the core of The Focus. Now, it's got to be noted that in December 1937 and January 1938, Churchill lost a huge amount of money in American stocks, and Wall Street was still quite volatile, even though it largely recovered structurally from the 1929 crash. Churchill had not reigned in his spending and his prodigal -

his son, a true prodigal of the total sort, couldn't be reined in. Churchill found himself once again nearly destitute. Lord Beaverbrook, who was kind of Churchill's last remaining patron in the newspaper publication business, and who wasn't quite literally paying out to him for charity like The Focus was to corral him into being the front man of their position, simply got sick of his warmongering. Beaverbrook, among other publications, ran the Evening Standard, banned Churchill's content, and canceled his contract, robbing him of substantial income. Churchill found himself in such dire straits that his family's ancestral estate at Chartwell was literally listed for sale. But then, what happens on March 28, 1938? A man, a Moravian Jew with close ties to the Czechoslovak government named Sir Henry Strakosch, a South African gold mining magnate, chairman of the Union Corporation Limited, pays all of Churchill's debts.

To ensure he could hold on to his estate, Strakosch assists him, according to some accounts, with a $1 million loan that would not accrue interest and would never have to be paid back – essentially, a gift. This is the point at which Churchill was truly owned by The Focus, in my opinion. How could one foresee coming back as an independent political figure after being so solidly patronized by figures like Baruch and others who were part of an ethno-sectarian ideology completely at odds with the national interest? If there was ever any question, I think this was the point where Churchill sold his soul. It may sound melodramatic, but let's return to Czechoslovakia and why the Munich issue was so engrossing and characterized in a certain way.

Czechoslovakia was actually 47% Czech, and more German than Slovak. About 25% of the population was German, concentrated in the Sudeten region bordering Germany, but Germans were spread throughout the country. It was also home to Poles, Lithuanians, Magyars – people who had never existed under a common polity. The idea of a Czechoslovak state was absurd, a contrivance in the wake of the Versailles Treaty chaos and misguided map redrawing.

It was a situation of solid Czech domination of the land. I won't make negative statements about Czech people, but they are very proud and nationalistic, much like most ethnic groups in Central Europe. If you were non-Czech under this regime, you couldn't freely practice your culture and pursue your own cultural existence, except as a kind of ghettoized minority, figuratively and literally. The Sudeten Germans were relatively well-off, but they were strongly resented. While the threat varied, there was a genuine risk of them being ethnically cleansed if ongoing social hostility escalated to real violence. This situation resembled a Bosnia-like scenario.

If someone wants a comparative model well within living memory, the irony lies in how people like Churchill, The Focus, and others presented Czechoslovakia as if its integrity was essential to the principle of self-determination. On one hand, they demanded the dismantling of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1919, arguing that discrete ethnic groups should have homogeneous states to pursue their own political and cultural destinies. Yet, they declared that this contrived state, a Frankenstein-like amalgamation of ethnicities ruled by Czechs, somehow reflected self-determination. The only reason it came into existence was due to certain intrigues.

Now, in 1919, France, under Clemenceau, declared that Germany must not be allowed to occupy the Rhineland, and this stance was non-negotiable. Clemenceau argued for a buffer state, acknowledging the vulnerability without the ability to defend in depth. The UK and the US rejected this claim, and Wilson proposed an alternative. He suggested creating a collective security pact involving the US, the United Kingdom, and France, where if France came under assault, the US and UK would be obligated to come to its aid. The US Senate rightly refused to ratify, leading the UK to back out as well.

Okay, so how was the French delegation appeased in the case of real appeasement? They were appeased by the creation of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, forming a little entente, if you will. Czechoslovakia extended into the territory of the North German plain, providing France with an Eastern ally state that could mobilize in the event of war and compromise Germany's ability to defend in depth by forcing a two-front conflict. Additionally, it created a second ally that theoretically was bound to fight in common.

When France went to war, it seemed incredibly foolish to suggest that anyone would go to war for Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia. I believe the idea was that if the strategic situation deteriorated enough, the fear of a unified German Reich would prompt people to find common cause. However, I don't think that's realistic either because in many ways, that's exactly what happened, and it worked largely in the Axis's favor. That's the background to this idea. Now, in 1938, the president of Czechoslovakia is Edvard Beneš. Now, something very conspiratorial happened immediately after the Anschluss, and it wasn't initially clear what was underway. So, we're going to have to jump forward a little bit and then back again.

Okay, in March 1938, immediately after the Anschluss, there's uproar among Germany's enemies, including The Focus as well as in the British Foreign Office and France. France has a very different political culture compared to the UK, as it is Germany's conventional enemy and a European rival power. While there isn't the same bitterness and ethnic-racial overtones as in the East, the enmity between France and Germany is well-known. So, France is obviously alarmed by the Anschluss.

They've got very close relations; Blum's government has very close relations with Benes. Immediately after the Anschluss, a rumor emerges and it becomes more than a rumor; almost immediately, it becomes a genuine war scare. Benes issues a statement that a German invasion of Czechoslovakia was imminent, and that the Wehrmacht was massing forces in the North German plain and throughout the Czech frontier, poised for assault. Benes then orders a general mobilization. Paris and Moscow both declare that they will come to the aid of the Czechoslovak army across the frontier. Even Chamberlain, realizing that he can't sit idly, particularly after this kind of concerted assault in the court of public opinion by Churchill, by the Foreign Office upon his decision-making, and now Anthony Eden's in on the act. Chamberlain makes a cryptic statement that London will not sit idly while an invasion is staged by Germany of any sovereign state. Now, Hitler was genuinely dumbfounded by this because there was no intention to assault Czechoslovakia, and there had been no deployment onto the frontier. Hitler is convinced that this might be some kind of ruse, perhaps originating in Moscow.

He doesn't know what to think. Generaloberst Jodl -  Jodl was, by this point, not a particularly close ally of Hitler. Although subsequently, he became very close and ended up becoming a powerful figure on the general staff. We know a lot about what transpired here because of what he relayed, and he had no reason to lie. He knew nothing would save him from a death sentence or anything. So on May 23rd, what Hitler does is, and he orders the Foreign Office and the diplomatic delegation in Czechoslovakia to approach Benes. They disclose that there's been no change in deployments on the frontier, and there's been no concentration of forces. Hitler is basically scrambling to avoid a war caused by misunderstanding or rumor. Now, Benes’ representatives to Hitler - representatives to the German Foreign Ministry, they reacted with apparent gratitude, but immediately thereafter, within 40 hours, Benes addresses his country. He said that he has called the bluff of the coward and bully Hitler, and that by demonstrating his will to fight and the will of the democracies to fight in the face of fascism, Hitler has been brought to his knees and exposed as a coward.

Now, Hitler hit the goddamn roof for a few reasons because, first of all, he realized Benes himself was the source of this rumor. He basically staged the war scare as a flex, essentially, to see exactly how he could manipulate France, Moscow, as well as London to come to his aid to preserve his government, which frankly had no real mandate anyway. But also, he wanted to try and put on a Mussolini act and create some kind of straw man.

Hitler responded publicly. For context, what was Benes doing during the Great War? He was, kind of gallivanting around. One of the reasons he became the president of Czechoslovakia was because he intrigued.  By today's standards, we consider him to be some kind of globalist liberal. He wasn't in the trenches; he was organizing committees, funding the Czechoslovak government after the war in which he’d enjoy a prestige role – and at the least a sinecure. In his statement, Hitler said "I spent four and a half years at the front fighting for my country. While Benes was intriguing, conspiring, and living lavishly, we fought and died in the trenches." And, there's a lot to be said for that. Like he basically - you don't impugn the manhood of a man like Hitler,  whatever you think about him.

That's, I mean, that's ridiculous. Okay, that's, and in those days, especially, especially then things like a man's honor really, really mattered so what Hitler then said to Keitel, who was another general officer who came to very high preeminence on the German staff later - he ordered Keitel to implement a gradual mobilization of the German army and prepare for Case Green, and Case Green was the code for war against Czechoslovakia. An immediate mobilization, but not one that would be noticed by, France and certainly not going to be noticed by Prague.

But Hitler realized that at some point if this was a disposition of Benes, he was quite obviously, at least I think it's clear, as, he was quite obviously hoping for a scenario that would trigger a general war before Germany was in any position to secure such a conflict victory. There are a lot of guys, and I'm not a military vet, and I don't know a lot about military science. Okay, guys go back and forth, and they give me scenarios. Could Germany have won a general war with Czechoslovakia in 1938?  And it becomes people endlessly arguing one or the other perspective. I don't have an opinion on that. But perception was that Germany would. I have no doubt that if it were thought it was critical to do so and the Prime Minister; he would have gone to war with Czechoslovakia. But could Germany have won, had Moscow, had Paris, had the UK come to fight? Could Germany have won that war? I don't know, and I'm not taking an opinion on that.

I'm just talking about the perception as it was vis-a-vis forces and being and everything else. But it's got to be said too what brought this to a head, these tensions were in Czechoslovakia, I mean, from 1920 to 1938, which is our now present. The Slovaks and Germans had been agitating to be free of Czech rule. And everybody the British, the French, Moscow everybody, the Poles, like everybody realized that attempting to create a proverbial ‘line in the sand’ on the issue of Czechoslovakia,  this was a bad decision. It was a far far more bad decision than to simply hand over the Sudetenland to the Germans. Nobody thought this was sustainable. Nobody thought this was a good idea. So, like the idea that Czechoslovakia was a stable country that had some kind of organic heritage politically or culturally, and had enjoyed strong legitimacy, that's completely false. And everybody, the reason why Chamberlain, after the Munich summit, the reason why he was congratulated is because for 20 years, people were convinced there was going to be a war over this issue. It wasn't because Hitler was invading places for no reason, and Chamberlain just kissed his ass, and like everybody just decided to kiss Chamberlain's ass for being passive or something or whatever they think.

Even Roosevelt congratulated Chamberlain  And on the whole, what happened when the Sudetenland was ceded to Germany? The several nationalities, including Slovakia, declared independence. And the Czech state imploded. And so we're supposed to believe the state that collapsed, that had no legitimacy, was some crime that it ceased to exist. I mean, should the United States have invaded Germany in 1989 because when East Germany just ceased to exist? I mean, and it sounds like I'm being funny, but I mean...

PETE

It sounds as familiar as to something that's happening right now.

THOMAS

Yeah, exactly. And that's kind of what I wanted to draw into the equation. I mean, the whole thing is what I kind of wanted to conclude on for this episode, and I don't want to go too far afield, but I know that I'm. Anytime you raise these kinds of revisionist issues, there's what people say; they say like, "Well, okay, fine. There are always political intrigues underway and all these kinds of competing ambitions. But, well the German Reich, which is this evil state, and it came into existence for the sole purpose of murdering people.’’ You can't look at it that way. And if you look at the New York Times, interestingly for the Kristallnacht, which was a really crummy thing to do—I mean, I don't need to get into specifics of it—, that's, there was basically not the cleansing operation in major German cities where a lot of Jews were beat up, a few lynched, and , Jewish property was destroyed. I mean, these kinds of things happen.

These kinds of things happen wherever there's hostility between ethnic groups, but the way Goebbels ministry handled it was grotesque, and I don't think anybody would say otherwise. But when these interventionists in the aftermath of that started clamoring for war the New York Times, which by no means is what it is today and certainly then it wasn't an America-first paper or anything, but they pointed out - they said Mr. Stalin's Soviet Union has arbitrarily executed exponentially more Jews than the Third Reich has. And that I mean that was true. Before a shot was fired in the Second World War, the Soviet Union annihilated approximately 10 million people. So when you're looking at what happened in the Second World War, whether you're talking about the annihilation of Jewish civilians or any other kind of grotesque violence against civilian populations, you're talking about the consequences of the war and not the causes. Saying that the UK had to assault Germany because Germany was going to do bad things to minority groups is like saying Japan had to attack the United States because the United States was going to wage a nuclear war on them.

People have a completely warped sense of how history actually developed and what the motives were of the players involved in what was a cause and what was an effect. But it's because, yeah, we've gone over an hour here. This is the last episode dedicated just to Mr. Churchill. I want to get into the war in the next episode. We dealt with the assault on Poland already because we dealt with the New Deal regime. I gave Mr. Churchill so much time because it's a very, very complicated issue. I want to get into, we're going to start just next time with a little bit about Churchill's his actual ascendancy to the prime minister, but then we're going to get right into the war.