The Armageddon Fraternity
Part II - German War Aims and Strategic Logic Therein
As has been noted in the earlier installment of this essay series, the great, and infamous, historian of the German Reich - quite literally, the historian of the Third Reich - Mr. David Irving was, and remains, the only historian to have written a dedicated volume (an exhaustive one at that; which includes a remarkable and voluminous treasure trove of direct testimony by the men who in fact were involved in the events in question at highest levels) about the German atomic bomb program and German atomic research (which during the war years can without error be presumed to be axiomatically military in purpose.
The historical Revisionist and the student of Revisionism alike must privilege facts over narrative, and must be comfortably biased in favor of the truth wherever the aforementioned facts lead him, psychically and morally. But just as important is a rigorous investigation of context - what can be thought of as the historical conditions that framed the conceptual horizons of the decision-makers, and the cultures that nurtured and educated them, at key junctures. This essential practice is, at base, what is missing from American historiography - even efforts not especially encumbered by Theological biases of the ruling caste and the founding myth of the Nuremberg system that is the sociopolitical and juristic basis of the Globalist world order.
In order to place the question of a German atomic weapons program in the appropriate aforementioned context, as well as to discern the strategic landscape that set the parameters of decision, actual and potential, within the mind Adolf Hitler and his Generals, as well as civilian scientists and engineers corralled into the war effort, notwithstanding their political preferences or relative enthusiasm, it is essential to understand the military and political situation of the German Reich vis a vis its primary enemies, what had been staked by the primary combatant states (with emphasis on the German Reich), what consequences the German Reich and its people risked in event of defeat, and what objectives had to be realized in order for Germany to achieve Endsieg or at least avoid catastrophe.
David Irving authored not only, as stated, the only investigative and academic historical study of the German atomic research program, but he also - prior to becoming targeted by Jewish censors - universally acknowledged as having written the seminal treatment of the German war effort - a massive volume that contains Irving’s thesis within its title: Hitler’s War. But did the war after December of 1941, as the Wehrmacht was stopped in its tracks at the gates of Moscow, truly ‘‘belong’’ to the Fuhrer? In other words, what states and what statesmen did fortune favor after 1941, and what possible outcomes could Hitler control or meaningfully effect, even marginally, in lieu of merely reacting to strategic catastrophe’s out of his, and Germany’s, control? Stated bluntly, was the War in fact Hitler’s war?
The Strategic Landscape of 1941
To understand the (ultimately fatal) German quagmire that developed in the Winter of 1941, it is essential to address the respective views from Moscow and Berlin, each of the other’s forces in being and deployments of those forces in being. The view from Moscow - more properly the view of Stalin himself - from late 1940 onward was of a German Reich, facing a massive, and likely insurmountable, front against the UK that stemmed from the Mediterranean to the Arctic Circle wherein scenarios facilitating a true German victory, not merely stalemate, appeared to strategic planners in the capitals of all major powers (combatant or not) to have long since drifted out of reach. America’s increasingly firm commitment to supporting, and bankrolling, the British war effort at all costs, coupled with the increasingly aggressive naval actions and provocative declarations of maritime sphere-of-influence (further and further from American territorial waters and contiguous zones) cast an ominous shadow over any German war plans.
As the year 1940 had dragged on, it became increasingly clear to Moscow - and Stalin in particular, that Germany was incapable of waging a truly protracted war on the Continent, considering its basic poverty of essential commodities and an inability to continuously (and rapidly) replace (projected) casualties on an ongoing basis. It was especially clear to Communist war planners that were the German Reich to be cut off from Romanian petroleum, any German war effort would be brought (literally) to a dead stop. It was obvious to the Kremlin, to America, to to London and especially to Stalin himself, that the German war machine was finding itself in increasingly desperate straits. All the while, the Soviet Union was building and mobilizing the most massive armed force in the history of the planet; yet court historians would have the contemporary student of the War believe that the Soviet Union, amidst the aforementioned conditions, was in basic terms existentially fearful of the German Reich, of its capabilities and of Adolf Hitler himself.
The preposterous character of the aforementioned claim, as well as the accompanying claim of benign and peaceful Communist intentions on the European continent is soundly rebutted not just by common sense and appeal to precedent but also by fact of the Molotov Communique, delivered - of course - on direct orders of Stalin to Berlin on November 12-13 in the year 1940. The communique contained a list of clear and unambiguous demands that were to be satisfied if the German Reich wished to continue to be protected from the possibility of a two front War (as the war with the U.K. dragged on, incident to London’s ‘war at any cost’ policy and refusal to abide unconditional offers of cessation of hostilities) by the continued observance of the terms of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (colloquially, the ‘‘Non Aggression Pact’’) between the German Reich and the USSR. As eminent German military historian Joachim Hoffman wrote:
[As the] strategic military situation for Germany, and its Axis partner Italy, was becoming increasingly more difficult, Stalin - through Molotov in Berlin - transmitted the delivery of a demand. The demand boiled down to an expansion of the Soviet ‘sphere of influence’ that was to include Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Greece, i.e. all of southeastern Europe - and in the north, Finland - with which a peace treaty had only been solemnly concluded in March of that year. A so-called, ‘‘Swedish Question’’ was also raised. The Soviet Union in other words was now demanding a dominant position in all of Eastern Europe and the Baltic. Futhermore, it demanded the creation of bases on the outlets of the Black Sea as well as discretionary passage through the outlets of the Baltic (Great Belt, Small Belt, Sund, Kattegat, and Skagerrack). The Reich, engaged in a struggle for its existence, would be hemmed in simultaneously from the north and south.
These demands, issued in the midst of an increasingly difficult military situation, were so provocative that they left the Germans, as a practical matter, with only one alternative: to submit to subjugation or to fight. If Stalin had really been afraid of Hitler…he would hardly have provoked the Germans in a manner that…amounted to a ‘summons’ - a thinly disguised demand for subjugation. That Molotov, in the days of his mission to Berlin, was in constant, intensive, telegraphic content with Stalin, proves beyond a doubt that he was acting on Stalin’s direct instructions.
Stated simply, the German Reich faced an existential crisis, not merely a strategic quagmire (although no power-political matter is exclusively ‘‘political’’ nor ‘‘military’’ this point bears emphasis, as it is not generally stipulated in the case of the Axis powers and their motivations for ‘suing for war’ in lieu of ‘peace’ as they did).
CONTINUED in PART III: Mr. Einstein Establishes the Armageddon Fraternity